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A SURVIVING VERSION OF THE COMMON SENSE 
PROBLEM OF EVIL: A REPLY TO TWEEDT
Jerome Gellman
Chris Tweedt has offered a solution to the “common sense problem of evil,” 
on which that there is gratuitous evil is justified non-inferentially as a trivial 
inference from non-inferentially justified premises by invoking versions of 
CORNEA. Tweedt claims his solution applies not only to the versions of the 
common sense problem of evil offered by Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty, 
but also to that offered by me in this journal in 1992. Here I argue that Tweedt 
fails to defeat this version of the problem. So even if Tweedt’s response to 
Draper and Dougherty is successful, a version of the common sense problem 
of evil survives.
Recently Chris Tweedt has offered a solution to “the common sense 
problem of evil” (hereafter: “CSPE”) by invoking versions of the skeptical 
theist principle CORNEA.1 Tweedt defines the CSPE as any argument in 
which either a premise that there is gratuitous evil is non-inferentially 
justified or a premise that obviously entails that there is gratuitous evil is 
non-inferentially justified, with such an argument concluding that God 
does not exist.2 Tweedt means to contrast CSPE with other arguments from 
evil, such as that offered by William Rowe, in which that there is gratuitous 
evil is inferred inductively, and to which CORNEA has already been applied 
by other critics of the argument from evil. The principle CORNEA, Tweedt 
notes, until now has been applied only to evidential versions of the problem 
of evil, and his aim is to show its successful application to CSPE.
Tweedt concentrates on versions of CSPE by Paul Draper and Trent 
Dougherty. Tweedt also argues, more briefly, against my version of CSPE, 
which appeared in this journal in 1992.3 In what follows I will show that 
whether or not Tweedt defeats the other two versions, he fails to solve my 
version of CSPE.4 So there is a surviving version of CSPE. I begin with 
brief descriptions of Draper’s and Dougherty’s version of CSPE in order 
1Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
2Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 394n15.
3Gellman, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil.”
4It might be possible to save Draper’s and Dougherty’s versions by explicating them ac-
cording to my version of CSPE. Here I do not enter into that discussion.
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to show later how my version contrasts with theirs and thereby survives 
Tweedt’s objections.
In Paul Draper’s version of the CSPE, someone’s belief that there is 
gratuitous evil is prima facie justified by an experience of a particularly 
poignant evil.5 The Draper scenario has these steps:
(1) S experiences what is to S a poignant evil.
(2) S forms the belief non-inferentially that the evil is gratuitous.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.
What makes this scenario an example of CSPE is that S’s belief in (2) is 
formed non-inferentially, not inductively.
Dougherty argues that if it seems to S that p, then S has to that extent a 
reason to believe that p, and if the seeming is strong enough S can be prima 
facie justified in believing that p.
(1) S experiences what is to S a poignant evil.
(2) S believes non-inferentially that God would not allow that evil.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.
Again, what makes this scenario an example of CSPE is that S’s belief in 
(2) is formed non-inferentially. (3)’s conclusion is said to follow trivially 
from the belief of (2).
Tweedt turns back these arguments with a version of CORNEA he calls 
“new CORNEA modified”:
For person P in a certain cognitive situation S, new evidence E is levering 
evidence for [hypothesis] H only if it is reasonable for P to believe that: if H 
were false, E would, in the situation S, likely be different.6
where “levering evidence” is evidence that has what it takes to support a 
shift by P to belief, non-belief, or disbelief. On this basis, Tweedt replies 
to Draper that in no circumstance is it reasonable for P to believe that if H 
(that evil is gratuitous) were false, then P would likely not experience E 
(poignant evil). One could be expected to experience poignant evil even 
if the evil is not gratuitous. Experiencing poignant evil does not justify 
thinking it gratuitous, since we cannot know enough about God’s mind to 
know why God would allow this or similarly poignant evils. With respect 
to Draper’s argument, the belief in (2) cannot be non-inferentially justified 
from the experience in (1).
Contrary to Dougherty, Tweedt likewise argues that P’s being strongly 
convinced non-inferentially that a loving God would not allow such suf-
ferings does not justify so believing. That is because God’s acceptable 
reasons for allowing poignant evils are way beyond P’s ken. The evil can 
5I note that Draper’s argument is part of a larger context of argumentation, which can be 
safely ignored for my purposes. 
6Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 400.
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be poignant and yet be fully vindicated for reasons known only to God. 
So, the belief in Dougherty’s (2) cannot be non-inferentially justified by 
the experience in (1). For Tweedt, the CSPE presents no prima facie reason 
against God’s existence.
In this exchange, all parties are assuming that gratuitous evil is incon-
sistent with God’s existence. This can be challenged. If God has deontic 
obligations, for example, then in meeting them, such as when obligated to 
keep a promise, God might have to allow gratuitous evil.7 Such challenges 
should not be relevant in the context of this article, however. The sole 
question here is whether CORNEA itself succeeds in solving the CSPE, 
or at least neutralizing it by showing that an experience of evil cannot 
count against God’s existence. If we accept an unrelated valid reason why 
God could allow gratuitous evil, then why bother with CORNEA at all? 
Let the CSPE have its gratuitous evils. Just point out that the CSPE fails 
because gratuitous evil is consistent with God’s existence. So, in a discus-
sion focused on CORNEA itself, we should assume that gratuitous evil is 
inconsistent with God’s existence.
Getting to my version now, I had written that there is a pre-philosophical 
relevance of evil to belief in God in “an experience of God’s non-existence.” 
I referred to a person who has an experience of evil and “right there in the 
evil perceives that God does not exist.” My claim was that there are evils 
in this world that elicit atheistic experiences, that is to say, experiences in 
which a person sees that the world is Godless:
What they perceive in the evil is that the world is Godless, without a God. 
God’s non-existence is made manifest to them. And they perceive this non-
existence in the utter repugnance and revulsion of the evil. . . . They perceive 
what they believe [about God] in the evil they know.8
Tweedt responds to this as follows:
CORNEA also works against Gellman’s version of the common sense 
problem of evil in which someone’s belief that God doesn’t exist is non-
inferentially justified on the basis of an experience of certain evils. This is 
because the alleged support fact relating the experience and the belief that 
God doesn’t exist doesn’t pass CORNEA’s test. The reason it doesn’t pass 
CORNEA’s test is similar to the reason given in this paragraph: according 
to skeptical theists, it’s reasonable for us to believe that whether or not God 
exists, we would still have the same experience of poignant evils.9
In order to clarify just what I had in mind in the above paragraph I define 
what I mean by an “irredeemable evil.” An irredeemable evil is one that by 
its very nature is so deeply and utterly evil that there is no possible world 
in which its existence should be allowed. There could not possibly exist 
7Leftow argues that God has deontic obligations in “God’s Deontic Perfection.” Pruss 
argues that God has no deontic constraints before creating a world, in “Divine Creative 
Freedom.” I am thankful to referees and the editor for having raised this issue. 
8Gellman, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil,” 215.
9Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401n34 (my emphasis).
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any good reason for allowing its existence, neither somehow the evil’s 
need for a greater good, nor any deontological reason. An irredeemable 
evil is evil all the way down to rock bottom, as it were, so that no good nor 
other reason could possibly go any deeper, as it were, to undercut it and 
make it allowed. This is not a matter of not being able to imagine such a 
good or such a reason, but a matter of it being utterly misguided to think 
that any reason could possibly make this evil allowable. One believes this 
by having come face-to-face with such an evil in one’s life. There could be 
no deontological reason, in particular, to allow such an evil any more than 
there could be a deontological reason when a person is hiding in your 
home, not to lie to those who are pursuing him and will do him harm. 
Irredeemable evil is gratuitous, but not all gratuitous evil need be irre-
deemable. Gratuitous evil is evil that is not justified, although there might 
be a possible world in which it is justified. To say that an evil is gratuitous 
is more in the nature of a prediction (or postdiction) rather than to assert 
an evil inherently irredeemable.
In my version of the CSPE, what a person non-inferentially believes 
is not only that an evil is a poignant evil, but that it is irredeemable. And 
what I want to claim against Tweedt is that experiencing irredeemable evil 
does count (defeasibly) against God’s existence. It is correct that poignant 
evil is consistent with God’s existence; however, irredeemable evil is not.
Now, if my proposal were analogous to either Draper’s or Dougherty’s, 
retaining stage (1), the scenario I propose would look like this:
(1) S experiences what is to S a poignant evil.
(2) S forms the non-inferential belief that this evil is irredeemable.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.
This scenario would fail against Tweedt’s objection. It is undercut by 
CORNEA. That an evil is poignant is not a reason to think that it is ir-
redeemable, even if it seems to be so. If God exists we could experience 
poignant evils, and believe non-inferentially they were not redeemable. 
But that would not be justified. We cannot know God’s reasons for al-
lowing poignant evils and so cannot base a belief of irredeemability 
merely on poignant evils.
A fully analogous form of my argument to those of Draper and Dougherty 
replaces their reference to a poignant evil in stage 1. with reference to an ir-
redeemable evil, as follows:
(1) S experiences what S takes to be an irredeemable evil.
(2) S forms the non-inferential belief that this evil is irredeemable.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.
Here S does not take an evil to be only poignant, but to be irredeemable. 
It seems to S to be irredeemable. From the non-inferential belief that it is 
irredeemable, S then has a reason to believe God does not exist.
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One way of understanding 1. is as
(1a) S has a judgmental seeming that the evil is irredeemable.
That would be like S experiencing an evil, gauging its degree of evil as it 
were, and S saying judgingly to herself, “This evil seems to me to be irre-
deemable.” The judging could be explicitly conscious, even very quick, or 
implicit for S. Then, in (2), S finds herself with the non-inferentially formed 
belief that the evil is indeed irredeemable. That would be something like 
S looking at the table and at the door and judging that the table cannot go 
through the door. S takes the table to be “door-impassible.” Then S forms 
the non-inferential belief that the table is indeed door-impassible.10
Now, (1a) would not do the trick of turning back Tweedt’s argument 
against me. For, then I would be arguing that its judgmentally seeming to 
S that an evil is irredeemable is more likely if God did not exist than if God 
did exist. Tweedt might counter that seeming judgingly cannot count, or 
not count significantly, against skeptical theism. For between the percep-
tion of the evil and the judgment that the evil is irredeemable a skeptical 
theist could intercede to object that S cannot be in a position to judge an evil 
to be irredeemable. That is because S cannot know enough about God’s 
purposes, the many goods that God knows of but S doesn’t, and the facts 
of the world, and so on, to make any such judgment. So, S’s belief that an 
evil is irredeemable cannot be warranted by being non-inferentially based 
on seeming judgingly that an experienced evil is irredeemable. Tweedt 
might conclude that “It’s reasonable for us to believe that whether or not 
God exists, one could still have a judgmental seeming of an evil being irredeem-
able.”
I leave aside the form of the argument from (1a) and strength of the 
reply to it, for there is a stronger way against Tweedt than using (1a), and 
that is by taking (1) as:
(1b) S perceives the very irredeemability of an evil.
In (1b) S has a perceptual seeming of the very irredeemability of an evil. To 
clarify this, I want to distinguish between what I call “perceptual content” 
and “embedded perceptual content.” Without getting too fussy, perceptual 
content is an element or elements sense-manifest in the perceptual cir-
cumstances. This includes the perceptual content of seeing a painting to 
have (manifestly) red coloring and the perceptual content of seeing it to be 
(manifestly) a picture of a young man. In contrast, I will say that content, C, 
is perceptually embedded in a perception, when (a) C is not a perceptual con-
tent per se, that is, is not sense-manifest content, (b) C is supervenient upon 
the perceptual content proper, (c) S perceives C along within the perceptual 
10Please note that in this sense S judgingly takes X to have A does not entail that S believes 
X has A. In the above example, S might take the table to be door-impassible, but not trust 
her judgment, or immediately change her mind, and never form the belief that it is door-
impassible. 
87A SURVIVING VERSION OF THE COMMON SENSE PROBLEM OF EVIL
content of the situation, and (d) S is non-inferentially aware of C within the 
perceptual situation.
The idea is that there is perceptual content phenomenologically im-
mediate, arising non-inferentially within a perceptual experience and 
embedded in the perception of the perceptual content, such that a person 
can be said to perceive that content as embedded in that perceptual context. 
It is the immediate perceptual non-inferential nature of the experience 
that makes people able to say that they perceive the embedded perceptual 
content. (I believe this distinction to be close to the distinction Robert Audi 
has in mind between qualities that are perceptual and those that are percep-
tible.11) Crucial here is that the beliefs about embedded perceptual content 
do not simply “arise from” or are “formed in one” as a result of having had 
a certain perceptual experience. These are perceptual beliefs, ones arising 
directly and non-inferentially from seemings of embedded perceptual 
content.
Here are four examples of what I am calling “perceptually embedded” 
content.
(1) With proper training, persons can see mu-mesons in a bubble-
chamber. The manifest perceptual content is bubbles in liquid hy-
drogen. Such persons see in seeing the bubbles, non-inferentially, 
the perceptually embedded content of mu-mesons.
(2) Even if we do not have a criterial notion of the relationship be-
tween behavior and looks and inner states, I can be said to see that 
you are angry, immediately and non-inferentially. I do not have to 
infer your anger from the way you behave or look. I see your anger, 
as perceptually embedded content.
(3) Various philosophers, including Thomas Reid, believe that a person 
can perceive moral qualities of a person or of an act. (Reid believed 
that to have a perception of moral qualities one need not even be 
consciously aware of the items upon which the moral perception 
supervenes.) Moral qualities of an act, such as wickedness, are not 
perceptual qualities, but can be what I call perceptually embedded in, 
for example, experiencing a person who behaves in certain ways.12 
A person can perceive as embedded perceptual content that an act 
was wicked or kind.
(4) A person can see the beauty of a painting, as a perceptually embedded 
content. That a painting is beautiful need not be an inference from 
its perceptual qualities. The beauty of a painting can be perceptually 
embedded, non-inferentially, in a perceptual experience. True, I might 
decide that a painting is beautiful after getting an explanation about 
its artistic qualities and then forming the belief that the painting is 
11Audi, Moral Perception, 35ff. 
12See Cuneo, “Reidian Moral Perception.” 
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indeed beautiful. In contrast, I remember visiting the Ronald Lauder 
Neue Gallery in Manhattan and entering a small room dominated by 
the large painting by Gustave Klimt, “Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer 
I,” also known as “The Woman in Gold.” I visually took in the paint-
ing and immediately, non-inferentially saw it, holistically, by way of 
the perceptual gestalt, as it were, to be beautiful. I immediately saw 
its beauty. The beauty of the painting was supervenient upon its per-
ceptual properties and was for me an embedded perceptual content, 
present within an overall perceptual content. I did not merely have 
the belief “formed in me” that it was beautiful. More strongly, I saw 
its beauty in seeing the painting itself.
Similar to these examples, I claim that a person can experience evil and 
just see its irredeemability right there in the evil. That it is irredeemable 
is embedded within the experience of the evil. A person need not simply 
have “formed in him” the belief that the evil is irredeemable. He need not 
judge that it is irredeemable; he sees that it is so, and his belief is a percep-
tual belief. In seeing irredeemable evil he sees that the world is without 
an all-loving God. He “sees” that God does not exist, then, in the sense in 
which he sees perceptually what is inconsistent with God’s existence.
What is crucial here is that the irredeemable nature of the evil is per-
ceptually embedded. It is both the perceptual status, and the embedded 
content being irredeemability, together that distinguish my version of the 
CSPE from the others. I suspect that regarding gratuitous evil a person 
could not possibly perceive the gratuitousness of an evil since, for one, a 
person could not presently perceive what is going to happen in the future 
over the long run. On the other hand, the perception of the irredeemability 
of an evil is a perception here and now of the very nature of the evil to be 
metaphysically beyond any possible allowing reason.
Objection. Seeing that evil is irredeemable is significantly different from 
what each of the above four illustrations have in common: seeing mu-
mesons, anger, everyday moral features, and beauty. What they have in 
common is that the respective perceptions depend upon a person having 
the appropriate background of training and/or acculturation that enables 
the very perception of the embedded content to occur. Only trained 
physicists will see mu-mesons; only person’s properly acculturated and 
socialized will see anger in the features of an observed person; and only 
morally competent persons will see wickedness in a perceptual situation. 
Only a person who has rich experience of beauty will be able to just see 
the beauty of the “Woman in Gold.” Yet, the objection goes, there is no 
training or prior acculturation that prepares a person to be able to see the 
irredeemability of the evil she is perceiving. The perception of irredeem-
ability is more like an ad hoc, one time off, kind of experience, which puts 
its validity in doubt in the way the illustrations are not in doubt.
To this I provide two replies. One is that the perception that an evil is 
irredeemable could be the result of extensive moral perceptual training 
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evincing the embedded perception of the evil being irredeemable. Rig-
orous moral training might prepare a person to morally perceive an evil 
to be irredeemable. Then, just as a person could be said to perceive the 
wickedness of an act, so a person could be said to see that a particular evil 
is irredeemable. The ability to see irredeemable evil would be a sub-talent 
of developed moral perceptual abilities.
Alternatively, it could be that no training beyond ordinary moral edu-
cation is needed. For it could be that most people would have perceived 
when an evil was irredeemable were it not for rich theistic acculturation 
that prevents theistic devotees from seeing what is there right in front of 
their eyes. If a mother is convinced that her son is innocent she might be 
unable to see the obvious evidence against him for what it is. He is guilty 
but she insists he is innocent. Free of the bias of theistic thinking about 
God and evil, it could be claimed in this version of CSPE, that there are 
evils that most people, with ordinary moral training could right off see 
to be irredeemably evil. Trained on moral perception alone, one might 
have such an experience of evils that he suddenly sees that they are ir-
redeemable. No special training might be needed beyond common moral 
competence.
Returning to my argument, now, plug in a perceptual principle of cre-
dulity
Credulity: If S has a perceptual seeming that p, S then has a reason to 
believe that p, and there could be a great enough number of perceptual 
seemings that p for S to be prima facie justified in believing that p,
where a “perceptual seeming” is either perceptual or embeddedly percep-
tual. So, my version of CSPE takes that if it perceptually seems to S that an 
evil is irredeemable, S would have gained some reason for the perceptual 
belief that an evil is irredeemable, and thus for thinking God does not 
exist. If S has many such perceptions, S would be prima facie justified in 
holding the perceptual belief that some evils are irredeemable, and thus 
that God does not exist.
Now, let us look again at Tweedt’s argument against my version of 
CSPE:
CORNEA also works against Gellman’s version of the common sense prob-
lem of evil in which someone’s belief that God doesn’t exist is non-infer-
entially justified on the basis of an experience of certain evils. This is be-
cause the alleged support fact relating the experience and the belief that 
God doesn’t exist doesn’t pass CORNEA’s test. The reason it doesn’t pass 
CORNEA’s test is similar to the reason given in this paragraph: according to 
skeptical theists, it’s reasonable for us to believe that whether or not God exists, we 
would still have the same experience of poignant evils.13
We must now alter Tweedt’s emphasized sentence to this:
13Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401n34 (my emphasis).
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It’s reasonable to believe that whether or not God exists, we would still perceive 
the irredeemability of evils.
This sentence does not merit acceptance. Consider, if there are no beau-
tiful objects, I should expect not to have perceptual seemings of beautiful 
objects. It follows from Credulity that it is more likely that I will perceive 
a beautiful object if such exists than if not. If I do have perceptual seem-
ings of the beauty of an object, it is more likely than not that there exist 
beautiful objects. The perception counts in favor of there being beautiful 
objects. If we suppose that I have a great many perceptions of beauty, that 
justification would acquire further weight, and I could eventually be prima 
facie justified in believing there were beautiful objects. My evidence can be 
defeated. But Credulity assures me that until it is shown otherwise, I have 
a reason to believe that there exist beautiful objects, and that my being 
mistaken is diminished accordingly.
Schopenhauer once advised people to tour a hospital to observe the 
variety and extent of human suffering in order to conclude that an all-
good God does not exist. Suppose I make that tour and begin to have 
many perceptions of unredeemable evil. Credulity assures me that until it 
is shown otherwise, I would have prima facie justification for believing that 
there are irredeemable evils. If God did exist, the chances are that I would 
not perceive the very irredeemability of such a great number of irredeem-
able evils, while if God does not exist this can be expected, or at least not 
at all unexpected.
Here lies the difference between judging-seemings and perceptual-
seemings. The latter are epistemically stronger than the former, for a 
resultant perceptual belief is directly based on the perception. Thus, the 
perceptual belief holds direct evidence for irredeemability. There is no 
gap of judgment between the perception and the perceptual belief. And 
in general, perceptual beliefs have autonomous epistemic standing, until 
defeated. Careful now: remember that the perceptual belief itself is non-
inferentially derived from the perception, not evidentially derived. That is 
what makes it count as a non-inferential argument on Tweedt’s definition. 
It is only after the perceptual belief is formed non-inferentially that S holds 
direct evidence for what follows. This counts as an example of the CSPE.
So, my scenario of the CSPE goes as follows, as opposed to those of 
Draper and Dougherty:
(1) S perceives the very irredeemability of an evil.
(2) S non-inferentially forms the perceptual belief that the evil is irre-
deemable.
(3) S’s perceptual belief counts against the existence of God.
What is different about my scenario from the others is that in step (1) S 
does not experience the evil only as poignant, and does not only take it 
to be irredeemable in the sense of judging it to be so, but experiences the 
91A SURVIVING VERSION OF THE COMMON SENSE PROBLEM OF EVIL
very irredeemability itself of the evil. Given (2), S now has some direct 
perceptual evidence that God does not exist. (1) is more likely to be true if 
God does not exist than if God does.
Again, although this works for irredeemability it does not work for just 
“gratuitousness.” For consider this course of events:
(1) S perceives the very gratuitousness of an evil.
(2) S non-inferentially forms the perceptual belief that the evil is gratu-
itous.
(3) S’s belief, being perceptual, counts against the existence of God.
I repeat my previous observation that in contrast to irredeemability, it is 
problematic to assume that gratuitousness could be an embedded percep-
tual content. That is because gratuitousness is more like postdiction and 
prediction about what has happened and will happen in the world. It is 
hard to think of this as perceptible, rather than judgmental. On the other 
hand, a person could perceive the nature of an evil to be so basically and 
utterly evil that, supervenient on that, a person sees that it is irredeemable.
Of course, saying that a person has a reason for believing God does 
not exist or even that she is prima facie justified in so believing, does not 
preclude the defeat of this justification. So, even if this version of CSPE is 
sound, which I think it is, it is not decisive for showing God does not exist. 
Yet, this version does show, against Tweedt, that there could be, from the 
experience of evil, a non-inferential reason or prima facie justification for 
God’s non-existence, not undercut by CORNEA. There exists a surviving 
version of the common sense problem of evil.14
Afterword. My late cousin Binyamin was a guest of the Nazis at the work 
camp of Auschwitz. He told this story, one of many, of a time he perceived 
the sheer irredeemability of evils he encountered. It was the eve of De-
cember 25, 1943. The Nazis assembled all of the inmates, wholly or almost 
exclusively Jews, in the camp yard. There was a huge, tall Christmas tree 
in the yard and a festive stage on which the Nazi officers stood stiffly in 
their best dress uniforms. A band was playing lovely Christmas carols. The 
prisoners were made to stand there for a time listening to the music. Then 
the Nazis hung ten Jews on the Christmas tree. The prisoners were forced 
to stay there at attention until the last hanging Jew stopped moving. All 
the while, the band played on, with the lovely Christmas carols.
Ben-Gurion University
14I am indebted to two referees who made constructive comments on a previous version 
of this paper. I am most grateful, however, to the editor for his insightful comments and 
suggestions and for his great patience during the process of my trying to get things right. I 
thank him dearly.
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